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Chapter 12  
 
 
The State and Civil Liberties in  
the Post-9/11 World  
 
MICHAEL SAWARD  
 
On 7 July 2005 four suicide bombers killed 52 people and injured many  
more on public transport in central London. There had been many warnings  
since the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 that  
Britain was also a prime terrorist target. The heavy involvement of the  
UK in the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 was perceived  
by many as increasing the chances that Britain would be targeted, though  
the government has maintained that the invasion of Iraq had not in itself  
increased this threat.  
 
After '717', Prime Minister Tony Blair declared that 'the rules of the  
game have changed.' The 'war on terror' had arrived, at great human  
cost, on home soil. And as the rules of international conflict and security  
had changed, he argued, so must the government's approach to individual  
liberties in Britain; the government would need to change certain  
rules too, taking new measures in order to protect British citizens from  
terrorist threats. Blair often repeated his view that the most basic liberty  
of all was the right to life; to protect British lives, some other civil liberties  
may need to be curtailed.  
 
The Government's key response to 717 was the Terrorism Bill 2005,  
the fourth major piece of anti-terrorism legislation since 2000. This legislation  
proposed to extend from 14 to 90 days the length of time that  
suspects could be held without charge, and created new offences of glorifying  
or inciting terrorism, attending a terrorist training camp or making  
preparations for acts of terrorism. These proposals extended and deepened  
challenges to traditional civil liberties in Britain, but in the context  
of 'changed rules'. The prime minister lost the vote in the House of  
Commons on the 90-days detention proposal in-November 2005, though  
he fought for it vehemently in the face of likely defeat, arguing that 'We  
are n,ot living in a police state but we are living in a country that faces a  
real and serious threat of terrorism' (BBC News 9 November 2005,  
http://news.bbc.co.ukl1/hiluk_politics/4422086.stm). After the vote, he  
claimed that 'the country will think parliament has behaved in a deeply  
 
 
 
 
irresponsible way'; quoting a senior police officer, he said 'We are not  
looking for legislation to hold people for up to three months simply  
because it is an easy option. It is absolutely vital. To prevent further  
attacks we must have it' (Sunday Times 13 November 2005). In short:  
the people want and need protection from proven, immediate threat; the  
measures needed may be extraordinary, but they are also necessary.  
 
The Blair government's anti-terrorism laws have been at the core of  
heated debate about security, civil liberties, and the proper understanding  
of (and relationships between) the two. Challenging traditional civil  
liberties in the face of external threats is not new in Britain, as I shall  
describe briefly in a moment. But varied voices accusing the Blair government  
of chipping away at time-honoured citizen rights and liberties have  
invoked more than the government's approach to the war on terror.  
Policies concerning, for example, the regulation of asylum seekers, the  
planned introduction of identity cards, action on anti-social behaviour  
and the challenge to the right to trial by jury have been framed by critics  
as evidence of a government that places too little value on basic citizen  
liberties. There is even speculative talk about the emergence of a new type  
of state, one whose regulation of the behaviour of citizens runs deeper  
than before in a democracy, giving rise to concerns about the 'security  
state', or even the emergence of a 'post-democracy'.  
 
In democratic systems such as Britain 'democracy' is never static; it is  
a label as well as a thing, and there is much dispute about what institutions  
and attitudes that label should be applied to. Both the substance and the  
symbolism of British democracy shift and change in the context of these  
debates about civil liberties. Competing conceptions of democracy run  
underneath many of the debates about civil liberties and the protection of  
citizens. The trade-off between security and civil liberties is very much of  
the moment. But this is far from being the first era in which critical  
observers have perceived governments encroaching on basic rights and  
liberties. Equally, is it the first time that governments have perceived the  
need to take steps to curtail the liberties of those they see as posing dangers  
to the polity or the society? Taking the 'long view' serves to remind us that  
such disputes are centuries old. Momentous questions of the liberty of the  
subject go back to Magna Carta in 1215 at least. Habeas corpus, the right  
of the individual not to be subject to arbitrary arrest, has been part of  
English law since the late seventeenth century. These principles are part of  
a broad and complex historical trajectory of rendering the executive  
accountable to Parliament and through the latter to the people. There are  
many historical examples of these rights and liberties being challenged by  
governments. In the late eighteenth century, Prime Minister William Pitt's  
government arrested and charged with treason several people suspected of  
dangerous sympathies with the anti-republican ideals of the French  
 
Revolution. The unsuccessful trials that followed were conducted in the  
name of national security. The fear of France under Napoleon, and over  
Irish rebellion in 1871, saw suspensions of habeas corpus and the use of  
detention without trial respectively.  
 
More recently, the Defence of the Realm Act of 1914 imposed wide  
powers of internment and of restrictions of liberty. Shortly prior to the  
outbreak of World War II, the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act authorised  
the Home Secretary to lock people up on the basis of his belief that  
a person was 'of hostile origin or associations'. Those identified as  
sympathising with fascism, most notably Oswald Mosley, were interned  
during the war. The so-called 'troubles' in Northern Ireland from the  
1960s to the 1990s saw the abandonment of trial by jury, the authorisation  
of detention without trial, the introduction of internment and the  
passage of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974, which was renewed  
annually. The perception that recent anti-terrorism legislation undermines  
civil liberties has its own reasons and style (and there are new and  
distinct characteristics to the threats that the government has based its  
justification for legislation upon), but there is a rich historical context  
into which all of the current debates fit (Bindman 2005).  
 
Policies in question  
 
Fears about the undermining of civil liberties under the Blair government  
have centred mostly upon anti-terrorism legislation. But those fears, and  
accusations, are often expressed with respect to other policies of the  
government, notably around asylum seekers and identity cards. Asylum  
seeking and immigration (legal and illegal) have become hot political  
issues around the world, not least across the European Union (EU), in  
recent years. In the past 20 years, asylum applications to EU states have  
grown enormously. The peak was in 1992, where the number of applications  
was over 684,000 (up from 50,000 in 1983). The number in 2002  
was 381,600 (Loescher 2005). Over this period, Germany was the largest  
recipient of asylum applications in Europe, though Britain took that  
mantle from 2000. In each of the years from 1998 to 2001, Britain  
received over 90,000 asylum applications and over 110,000 in 2002.  
 
Under the Blair government, there have been a range of measures,  
legislative and administrative, designed to limit the number of asylum  
applications. Border-control measures at points of entry into the country  
have been increased. Detention of those whose claims have been refused  
has risen in prominence. Detention, in centres such as the UK's largest,  
Yarls Wood in Bedforshire, has been controversial. Accusations of racist  
abuse by staff, the lack of educational provision for children in detention,  
 
 
and a lack of safety for women and children in detention have been  
prominent (Guardian 27 July 2005). Benefits have also been an issue; the  
1999 Immigration and Asylum Act took asylum seekers out of the UK  
benefits system and introduced shopping vouchers for refugees. This was  
seen as a way to make asylum seeking a less attractive option to those  
considering entering the country. Under the Asylum and Immigration Act  
2004, benefits in some parts of Britain could be withdrawn from asylum  
seekers whose applications had failed, giving rise to fears that families  
could become homeless and face the prospect that their children might be  
taken into care (Guardian 10 August 2005). From the government's  
point of view, controlling the numbers of asylum seekers was a question  
of the integrity of borders and internal security. Its actions were variously  
heckled and supported by often sensationalist tabloid newspaper headlines  
likening the numbers of refugees coming (or potentially coming) to  
the UK as a 'flood', and linking asylum seekers to criminal activity and  
terrorist threats (Huysmans 2005).  
 
Concerns about the treatment of asylum seekers centred upon the withdrawal  
of benefit rights and the undesirable conditions in which they were  
detained or maintained. These were matters of civil rights, along with  
concerns about the deportation of failed asylum seekers to countries where  
they may face danger. A very different issue that nevertheless sometimes  
became linked to asylum seeking (and indeed anti-terrorism legislation)  
was the government's proposal to introduce identity cards for UK citizens.  
The Identity Cards Bill of 2005 was seen by the government as a means to  
combat illegal immigration, fraud, terrorism, organized crime and theft of  
identity. Critics raised concerns about what the information on the identity  
cards (which would include biometric data on individuals) could be  
used for, and worried that their introduction could lead to the criminalisation  
of many who refused to carry them. Many critics have viewed identity  
cards as potentially undermining the liberties of UK citizens.  
 
Issues of asylum and identity cards have in recent years increasingly  
been linked to anti-terrorism measures. Often ill-informed commentary  
linked refugees to the import of the terrorist threat into Britain; and  
debates around identity cards have regularly included disputes about  
whether their introduction would or would not assist authorities in  
protecting citizens against terrorist threats on UK soil. But it is on antiterrorism  
legislation itself that the most prominent debates about civil  
liberties have taken place.  
 
There are four pieces of legislation which have defined the Blair  
government's response to what it perceives as an immediate threat from  
terrorism.  
First, the Terrorism Act 2000 built on prior laws arising from the longstanding 
situation in Ireland, offered broad definitions of terrorism and  
associated offences, and gave power to proscribe organisations deemed  
to pose terrorist threats to the UK. It also enhanced powers to seize  
terrorist property and disrupt terrorist financial activity; granted police  
powers with regard to terrorist investigations (such as stop-and-search  
powers); created several offences specific to terrorism, such as fund raising,  
dealing with proscribed groups in various ways, and training terrorists;  
and required an annual report on the operation of the Act to  
Parliament.  
 
Second, the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001  
was passed in the wake of September 11 and amounted to the first  
major response by the British government to those attacks. The main  
provision of ATCSA concerned detention without trial of foreign  
nationals suspected of involvement in terrorism. The government saw  
extended detention as necessary, partly because international law  
prohibited the deportation of suspects where their lives may be in  
danger. At the same time, the government maintained that although law  
enforcement agencies may have strong grounds for suspecting involvement  
in terrorism, little of the evidence would be admissible in a criminal  
court or would be impossible to reveal in Court without exposing  
sensitive capabilities or endangering sources of information. Further  
powers under the Act involved the creation of offences related to  
hoaxes involving dangerous substances and further tools to combat the  
financing of suspected terrorist activities. The Act also gave the police  
more powers to hold and question suspects. ATCSA was targeted by  
many for its overturning of long-standing British judicial principles,  
particularly in its legitimising of indefinite imprisonment of suspects  
without charge or trial. Detainees could not see the evidence against  
them or have it tested before a court in the usual way. There was a  
special secure court without a jury, the Special Immigration Appeals  
Commission (SIAC), to which a limited number of lawyers were  
allowed access, which could hear appeals by detainees. Eleven men  
were detained under the Act and held in Belmarsh prison in South  
London, without charge. Nine appealed to the highest court in the  
country, the House of Lords, in the latter half of 2004. The detainees'  
lawyers argued that the relevant measures in the ATCSA 'were an  
affront to democracy and the internationally accepted notion of justice'  
(Independent 5 October 2004).  
 
The Law Lords, the highest court in the UK,.ruled, in December 2004,  
that detention without trial as expressed under the Act contravened the  
European Convention on Human Rights as it allowed detentions 'in a  
way that discriminates on the ground of nationality or immigration  
status' by justifying detention without trial for foreign suspects, but not  
Britons. Britain has 'derogated' (opted out) from the European  
 
Convention with respect to detention without trial. The Convention  
allows such derogation under circumstances amounting to an emergency  
situation in face of imminent threat to the country. But the Law Lords  
were scathing in declaring this unlawful. Lord Hoffmann argued that  
'The real threat to the life of the nation ... comes not from terrorism but  
from laws such as these' (quoted in Observer 19 December 2004).  
 
Third, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, passed by Parliament  
after heated debate in April 2005, was effectively the government's  
response to the House of Lords ruling on ATCSA. The Lords declared the  
sections of ATCSA which dealt with detention of foreign terrorist suspects  
incompatible with European human rights law on two basic grounds: it  
was discriminatory in that it singled out non-British citizens, and that it  
was a disproportionate response that did not justify Britain opting out of  
the relevant European human rights laws. The Prevention of Terrorism  
Act essentially replaces detention of suspects by a process of 'control  
orders'. These control orders could take a variety of forms, the most stringent  
and controversial of which was 'house arrest' -a phrase commonly  
used in debates on the Bill but avoided by the Home Secretary, Charles  
Clarke, and his government colleagues. Unlike the detention provisions in  
the ATCSA, these control orders could be applied equally to British  
nationals and foreign suspects. As under ATCSA, there would be limited  
and restricted types of judicial involvement, but at the end of the day the  
Prevention of Terrorism Act grants power to the Secretary of State, acting  
under advice from the security services, to impose various restrictions on  
the liberty of individuals who could not be deported and who, if their  
cases were brought before the courts in the conventional manner, would  
be unlikely to receive sentences commensurate with the Home Secretary's  
view of the extent of the threat that their activities posed. With regard to  
the latter, the sensitive nature of the intelligence upon which these judgments  
would be made in the first place, and the inadmissibility of phonetap  
evidence in the courts, also in the government's view made use of the  
conventional court procedures inappropriate. After the Lords ruling on  
ATSCA, the Belmarsh detainees were released, but the majority of these  
men became subject to control orders under the new legislation.  
 
Fourth, the Terrorism Bill 2005, the most recent anti-terrorism  
measure, was put together in the wake of the attacks in London in July  
and was working its way through Parliament at the time of writing. Its  
central elements were heightened government powers to deport people  
from the UK who are considered to be promoting terrorism; the extension  
of powers to detain suspects for up to 90 days without charges being laid  
before a court; and a new offence of 'glorifying, exalting or celebrating'  
terrorism. The proposed legislation also targeted incitement of terrorism  
and the dissemination of material perceived to promote terrorism.  
 
Political opponents of the government, and civil-liberties groups,  
expressed concern in particular about the increased detention provisions  
-a further challenge to basic principles of not being detained without due  
legal process, from their point of view -and about the ambiguity of  
'glorifying' terrorism, which they feared might result in much wider  
restrictions on freedom of speech. Some critics asked whether open  
support for Nelson Mandela prior to the dismantling of apartheid in  
South Africa would have amounted to an offence under the proposed  
laws. The Blair government was defeated on one key proposal in the  
Terrorism Bill in November 2005 when the House of Commons rejected  
detention without trial for 90 days in favour of a lower period of 28 days.  
Initial media coverage focused on the whether this defeat, the first time  
the Labour government had lost a Commons vote, represented the beginning  
of the end of Blair's prime ministership.  
 
Political rhetoric and underlying ideals  
 
How do present debates surrounding such controversial measures as the  
effective policing of terrorism invoke different visions or conceptions of  
democracy? For example, political actors, in making principled and practical  
objections to government actions, offer their own implicit or explicit  
criteria against which to judge the government's or system's performance.  
Particular political actors tend to be the 'carriers' or 'purveyors'  
of competing models of democracy as can be glimpsed when we trace  
some key threads in the debates surrounding the 2001 and 2005 antiterrorism  
legislation in particular.  
 
Debates around anti-terror legislation are replete with key words and  
signifiers which carry powerful but ambiguous resonances. 'Freedom' is  
deployed on the side of those proposing restrictions on certain classes of  
people in the name of 'security'. The idea of the state as a provider of  
'protection' for citizens in a democracy has played a key part too. The  
very survival of democratic systems and practices in the face of the  
'threat' posed by international terrorism is invoked by the UK government.  
The value, renewal and survival of democracy, the role of the state  
in protecting basic democratic rights and freedoms, are precisely the sorts  
of issues that go to the heart of what democracy is, and what it ought to  
be. A range of principles have been invoked .and expounded in the  
debates around anti-terrorism legislation. In addition to concerned and  
interested citizens, a range of actors were involved:  
 
• the government;  
• opposition parties and their parliamentary spokespersons;  
 
 
 
• opponents outside Parliament such as civil-liberties groups;  
 
• the judiciary; and, not least  
• media figures.  
 
A range of factors were also in play in these tussles:  
 
• the manner and speed with which legislation was passed;  
• the public debate as played out in the news media;  
• concern for the proper role of the judiciary within a democracy;  
• the deep historical character of the liberties of the individual which  
some perceived to be under threat (either by terrorism, or by the legislation  
designed to protect against it);  
• the proper nature of the relative power of the executive in a democracy;  
and  
• how one might judge the extent of a 'threat' and therefore what might  
be a proportionate response.  
 
 
For the Blair government, the 'threat' of terrorism to Britain was  
immediate, it constituted an emergency, and it justified the taking of  
whatever steps were deemed necessary to combat it. The words 'threat',  
'security' and 'protection' have permeated ministerial speeches and those  
documents introducing or defending the measures represented in the  
ATCSA 2001, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and the Terrorism  
Bill 2005. This has not simply been one thread amongst others in the  
Blair government's approach to its governing tasks in recent years, but  
very much at the centre of its rhetoric and specific proposals. Consider  
the Queen's Speech of November 2004, which was described as follows:  
 
The government's programme is overwhelmingly dominated by issues  
relating to crime, anti-social behaviour and, most obviously, security.  
It is littered with references to the threat from global terrorism and the  
fact that we all live in a 'changing and uncertain world'. And its tone  
is set by a series of measures including proposals for ID cards, an organized  
crime bill and a counter terrorism bill, all designed to address  
what Tony Blair believes is the greatest challenge of the modern world.  
(BBC News November 2004, http://news.bbc.co.ukllihiluk_politics/  
4034903.stm)  
 
The world is changing, the country faces grave threats, and has to act  
in a way adequate to these threats. The nature of the challenge is 
unprecedented:  
in Blair's own words, 'Here in this country and in other nations  
round the world, laws will be changed, not to deny basic liberties but to  
prevent their abuse and protect the most basic liberty of all: freedom  
from terror' (quoted in Huysmans 2004,325). Note too that this is very  
much a national agenda. Although civil liberties campaigners and others  
applauded the Blair government's passing of the Human Rights Act  
1998, which incorporated into British law the European Convention on  
Human Rights (discussed below), derogation or opting out of provisions  
of the Act under certain specified circumstances has been a core part of  
the government's measures against terrorist threats (as we saw, the Law  
Lords' important ruling of late 2004 contradicted key grounds of such  
derogation). The government has been keen to see that European law  
does not undercut, as it sees it, efforts to protect British citizens. For  
example, proposed new EU rules announced in September 2005 regarding  
rights of appeal for failed asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, how  
long they can be held, and safeguards with respect to returning deportees  
to countries where they may face torture, raised concerns within the  
government that their plans to deport terrorist suspects would not be  
able to go ahead. Home Secretary Charles Clarke has made it clear, in  
such cases, that he would act where possible to circumvent European  
restrictions, notably by signing bilateral memorandums of understanding  
against torture with the governments of nations to which deportees  
may be sent. The general point is that the British government has  
assumed its right to act as it sees fit in the face of new threats in a changed  
world; democracy and protection are a national matter before they are  
questions of European or other international standards or charters.  
 
Clearly, this is democracy in 'protective' mode. The job of government  
is to protect the people, and to regard as important, but secondary,  
qualms about marginal restrictions on people's liberties where such  
restrictions bolster protection. New times and new uncertainties demand  
protective democratic action by government. Now, of course, protective  
measures beyond the normal remit of the law can only be acceptable if  
the character and immediacy of the new threats are such that they justify  
such measures. The Prime Minister's (and Home Secretary Charles  
Clarke'S) view that the rules of the game had changed after 717 meant  
(presumably) that further restrictions on certain civil liberties in the name  
of a wider security may be needed, and that the government would not  
hesitate to introduce them. Government underlining and reinforcing of  
the sense of immediate and highly dangerous threat to the British people  
is ubiquitous. The Home Office's own briefing paper, International  
Terrorism, provides a flavour of this case. It outlines 'the nature of the  
terrorist threat we face and how it differs from previous threats of this  
kind', noting that to 'protect' is a key part of the necessary response.  
Throughout, though, the aim is 'reconciling liberty and security', acting  
'without compromising the openness of our society or the freedoms we  
value'. 'Liberty with security' is the goal. But it must be realised that the  
 
threat amounts to an 'emergency', and 'democratic governments have  
long accepted that such emergencies may justify some temporary and  
limited curtailment of individual rights where this is essential to preserve  
wider freedoms and security'. The government has found such actions  
'necessary', because it is dealing with 'an unprecedented challenge'  
(Home Office 2002a). So altering the laws so that for example forms of  
detention without the normal legal processes, control orders, limited  
judicial involvement, and new restrictions on freedom of speech, could  
be legal is a response to a threat that is both grave and new.  
 
Although measures to deal with the terrorist threat are not permanent,  
no one should expect that they would not be needed for some time: 'we  
need to recognize the resilience of the terrorists. This is not a threat which  
can be overcome quickly or where negotiation is possible' (Home Office  
2002a, 1). That fact is reinforced by ministers conveying their sense of  
the character of the enemy -it is not one thing, in one place, or even readily  
seeable or identifiable. As David Blunkett, the then Home Secretary,  
stated in the House of Commons in October 2002, 'al-Qaeda and its  
offshoots' have 'a network of cells and the loose confederation of those  
who are not parts of its central core but who are prepared to support and  
help it' (House of Commons debates 10 October 2002). In formulating  
laws and other measures to combat this amorphous, highly dangerous  
and immediate threat, Mr. Blunkett (a controversial figure, seen as a realistic  
progressive by supporters and an illiberal reactionary by his critics)  
wanted answers, not arguments which failed to recognise the threat's  
nature: 'All I want is that people come up with solutions, not with objections,  
because in the end the primary duty of Government is to protect  
our citizens from the undermining of their freedoms and democracy by  
those who know no bounds and have no understanding of the issues of  
punishment or prosecution when they take the lives of others through  
suicide bombing' (House of Commons debates 23 February 2004).  
 
One can also see in the government's approach the effort to instill a  
sense of common purpose in the face of the 'threat'. As Charles Clarke,  
Blunkett's successor as Home Secretary, said in the House of Commons  
in 2005 in the debate about the Prevention of Terrorism Act: '[a ]l-Qaeda  
and its associates have a strategy to destroy the central themes of our  
democratic society, and this House must decide how best we can address  
that threat. In so doing, we must seek to analyse and understand the  
threat that we face, which we have done -we have laid the results before  
this House and are trying directly to assess the threat ... [W]e must  
acknowledge that British citizens as well as non-British citizens are  
focused on the target of seeking to destroy through terrorist activity the  
society that we seek to represent' (House of Commons debates 28  
February 2005).  
 
There are four threads in the government's style and rhetoric that are  
worth noting at this point:  
Firstly, its approach implies that it is acting as the defender of basic  
rights and liberties. Most often, the government expresses this view in  
terms of its defence of the most basic liberty, that of freedom from terror,  
or of the most basic right, that to life. In the words of Tony Blair, the  
government has sought to 'protect the most basic civil liberty of all,  
which is the right to life on behalf of our citizens' (Guardian 16  
September 2005).  
 
Secondly, it asserts strongly its right as a national government to  
protect its citizens as it sees fit, within its European and international  
obligations where essential but by taking a separate legal or administrative  
path where it perceives that as necessary and feasible.  
 
Thirdly, the government is fond in these debates of the discourse of  
'balance'. The relationship between civil liberties and security in the  
changed world carries key questions of striking the 'right balance' between  
the two. It is careful not to deny the importance of fundamental civilliberties,  
but talk of balance is quite explicit in its aim to revisit, and if necessary  
to curb with reluctance and limitations, some cherished civil liberties.  
 
Fourthly, it sees the balance between the executive and the judiciary in  
the UK shifting somewhat in this context. It is careful not to speak of  
undermining the traditional role of the courts in the UK system, least of  
all the judiciary's right to review the legality of legislation. But its antiterrorism  
measures have been seen by many in the judiciary (as we shall  
see briefly below) as challenging age-old patterns of balance between the  
executive and judicial branches of government in the UK. The government's  
interpretation of 'balance' does not, on the whole, sit comfortably  
with other notions of constitutional balance between these separate arms  
of the British state.  
The rhetorical justifications built around the terms 'protection' and  
'security' carry particular interpretations of what and who needs protection  
and security. It is very much the British people, and its way of life,  
that needs protection and security. That sounds perfectly uncontroversial,  
and in one sense it is. But, as we shall see, it is not the only interpretation.  
Interestingly, talk of striking a new 'balance' between protecting  
Britons from terrorism and civil liberties also received support from  
other sections of the executive branch of the UK government. The head  
of Britain's internal security service, MIS, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller,  
spoke in September 2005 of the difficulties of protecting citizens  
within the law when unclear intelligence leads authorities to believe that  
a terrorist attack is being planned, but where there is insufficient evidence  
to lead to charges being laid successfully. She defended the importance of  
civil liberties and 'hard-fought-for' rights, but noted that 'the world has  
changed and there needs to be a debate on whether some erosion of what  
we all value may be necessary to improve the chances of our citizens not  
being blown apart as they go about their daily lives' (BBC News 10  
September 2005, http://news.bbc.co.ukJlIhifukJ4232012.stm).  
 
Other actors saw this 'balance' differently. Opinion in the judiciary  
was not uniform by any means, but there were many strong judicial criticisms  
of the key features of the legislation discussed here. The importance  
of the rule of law in a democracy was an important theme in  
judicial criticism. One of the Law Lords who ruled that the ATCSA  
provisions on detention without trial were unlawful, Lord Nicholls, said  
in his ruling that 'Indefinite imprisonment without charge or trial is  
anathema in any country which observes the rule of law' (BBC News 16  
December 2004, http://news.bbc.co.ukJlIhifukJ4100481.stm). One High  
or Appeal Court judge, speaking anonymously, expressed great concern  
about the Prevention of Terrorism Act's 'control orders' in a similar  
concern for the basic rule of law in a democracy: 'It has to be pointed out  
to the public that these quite draconian measures apply to them -not just  
to bad people but to everybody. They may think that the government will  
only apply them to bad people but there is a risk that they will be applied  
to cases where they're not justified' (Guardian 26 April 2005). Another  
High Court judge added: 'I think the executive takes too much power in  
relation to terrorism and in relation to shutting people up without trial'  
(ibid.).  
 
Tony Blair warned in 2005 that he would have 'a lot of battles' with the  
courts if they acted to block the deportation of extremists, talking of  
renouncing part of the European Convention on Human Rights  
(Independent 11 August 2005). In return, senior judges have told the  
government that they would fight 'root and branch' any moves to undermine  
the independence of the judiciary. High-level invocation of democracy  
has been a key part of judicial warning shots aimed at the  
government's rhetoric over its anti-terrorism measures. A deputy High  
Court judge, Lord Carlile, said that 'If the Government undermines the  
judiciary, then the judiciary might be tempted to undermine the  
Government ... If we get into that state of affairs we undermine democracy.  
That is something the judiciary won't do, and the Government  
would be foolish to do it' (Independent 11 August 2005). A former Law  
Lord, Lord Clyde, said that 'The importance of the independence of the  
judiciary ... is beyond question. The function of the judiciary is to uphold  
the constitution. If a judge ... considers the constitution and the Human  
Rights Convention is in peril, he must act accordingly. This is vital for  
democracy' (ibid.). Here we can see that questions of 'balance' from the  
government’s point of view are interpreted as an imbalance, a challenge or  
potential challenge to the basic principle of judicial independence.  
 
The lawyers for the nine foreign terror suspects detained in Belmarsh  
prison were, not surprisingly perhaps, more fulsome in speaking of what  
they saw as the larger constitutional significance of the laws they sought  
to oppose. They told the panel of nine Law Lords that the relevant  
measures in the ATCSA 'were an affront to democracy and the internationally  
accepted notion of justice'. Ben Emmerson QC, representing  
seven of the detainees, was reported as claiming that the detention  
provisions 'threatened the values they were designed to protect', and  
was quoted thus: 'We say in a democracy it us unacceptable to lock up  
potentially innocent people without trial or without any indication  
when, if ever, they are going to be released' (Independent 5 October  
2004).  
 
The government's most recent proposals such as targeting the justification  
or glorification of terrorism have met with judicial criticism, along  
with criticism from civil-liberties group Liberty, an organisation that has  
been prominent in these debates. Addressing earlier concerns over the  
government's anti-terrorism legislation, Liberty expressed its belief that  
'in a democracy, the values of public protection and the rule of law are  
not mutually exclusive.' It defended the presumption of innocence, which  
the detention and control-order provisions of anti-terror legislation were  
seen to have undermined: 'we appreciate that the presumption of innocence  
is never the most fashionable idea at times of heightened fear. It is,  
however, a key distinguishing feature of a healthy democracy' (Liberty  
August 2004).  
 
With respect to the 2005 proposals to outlaw justification or glorification,  
Shami Chakrabarti, director of Liberty, asks, 'What is meant by  
"terrorism"? What kind of behaviour constitutes "justification"? Could  
this cover political debate about the circumstances in which it is acceptable  
to take up arms against non-democratic regimes across the world?'  
(Guardian 24 August 2005). Elsewhere, she said that 'glorification' was  
so broad that it would 'make loose talk a serious political offence'  
(Independent 16 September 2005). Critics from the judiciary, pressure  
groups and the press argued that the government already had at its  
disposal sufficient powers to prosecute those who incite violence; further  
legislation was unnecessary and, it has sometimes been suggested,  
involves a disturbing accretion of further powers to the executive.  
 
There are other critics of course, too numerous to mention fully here.  
Geoffrey Bindman reinforced basic values of a liberal democracy, stressing  
the damage (as he saw it) to time-honoured individual rights and freedoms  
in the provisions of ATCSA: 'For the first time since 1945 the  
executive was given power to detain indefinitely without a charge being  
laid, and, crucially, without the detainee having the opportunity of  
answering the evidence by which the detention is justified.' He went on  
to argue, making the larger connection to the character of democracy, 'it  
is a disturbing feature of current British and American governments ...  
that in the guise of protecting the public they are ready to abandon principles  
which are the hallmark of democracy' (Bindman 2005). Journalist  
George Monbiot was even more forthright. Criticising provisions such as  
the Terrorism Act 2000 for placing restrictions on legitimate protest, he  
wrote: 'Democracies such as ours will come to an end not with the stamping  
of boots and the hoisting of flags, but through the slow accretion of a  
thousand dusty codicils' (Guardian 3 August 2004). Blick and Weir, writing  
in the context of the 2005 proposals, argue for an urgent answer to  
the question of how effective the government's anti-terrorism proposals  
might be, considering that the government's strategy and laws 'will have  
a profound effect on British democracy, the rule of law, criminal justice,  
the conduct of police and security forces, civil and political rights and the  
shape of community relations perhaps for generations to come' (Blick  
and Weir 2005).  
 
A Labour dissenter from the government's proposals in the Prevention  
of Terrorism Act, former Foreign Secretary, the late Robin Cook, articulated  
one key plank of a liberal conception of democracy in these debates  
when he addressed ministers' arguments that 'the safety of the public  
must come before the liberty of the individual': this is fine when it is your  
safety and somebody else's civil1iberty. But liberty is indivisible. A  
measure that curtails the liberty of one citizen necessarily curtails the  
liberty of every citizen' (Guardian 4 March 2005). Leader of the Liberal  
Democrats, Charles Kennedy, offered a similar appraisal in his comments  
on the same proposals.  
 
Of course, critics aim at different targets, argue in diverse ways, and  
seek to defend a diversity of institutions and values. Nevertheless, it is not  
stretching things too far to suggest that there are some central threads  
that bring together judicial, civil liberties and other critics:  
 
• Government opponents point out that a range of rights and liberties  
need to be protected at all times. To quote Chakrabarti: 'We need to  
focus on what unites us in the struggle against terrorism -our fundamental  
values. These values are human rights; the bedrock of our  
beliefs, not a convenience, a luxury or a pick and mix' (Refugee  
Council News 26 August 2005).  
• Critics tend to support strongly the independence of the judiciary and  
the fundamental and unshifting character of the rights and liberties  
that the judiciary exists to defend.  
• The European and international rights obligations on the government  
are declared to be non-negotiable, not optional according to circumstances.  
 
 
• The idea of 'balance' between security and liberty is regarded as  
suspect; instead, especially from the point of view of judicial critics, the  
'balance' within the constitutional structure of British government  
between the powers of the executive and the judiciary is the most  
crucial balance to be sustained.  
 
A good deal of these debates revolve around what actions, moral  
imperatives and laws are most 'basic' or 'fundamental'. In this context it  
is instructive to consider briefly the life and times of the Human Rights  
Act (HRA). After many years of debate in the UK, the HRA incorporated  
into UK law the European Convention on Human Rights, effectively  
making the Convention a codified and vital part of the British  
constitution. It contains provisions regarding the right to life, prohibition  
of torture, the right to a fair trial, rights to privacy, freedom of  
thought and conscience and religion, freedom of expression and assembly,  
and the prohibition of discrimination. The courts cannot strike  
down legislation on the basis of the HRA, but they can rule that legislation  
is incompatible with its provisions, and leave the response to that  
ruling to government and Parliament. The HRA has been subject to  
controversy and sections of the media -and the Conservative Party have  
highlighted how, in their view, it has benefited unworthy groups  
such as travellers, prisoners, illegal immigrants and terrorist suspects.  
With regard to anti-terrorism laws, David Blunkett, when Home  
Secretary, warned judges that curtailing civil liberties in the fight against  
terrorism was a matter for Parliament, not the courts (Guardian 25  
September 2001); Tony Blair has argued that 'Should legal obstacles  
arise, we will legislate further, if necessary, amending the Human Rights  
Act in respect of the interpretation of the European Convention on  
Human Rights' (quoted in Guardian 31 October 2005). Opponents of  
this view espoused the HRA's 'fundamental' character, arguing that the  
government and Parliament must operate within it rather than seek to  
challenge or modify its provisions; defenders of the government's view  
stressed the 'basic' role of the government in providing 'security'.  
Labour's willingness to amend the Act has been surpassed by the  
Conservative Party's action in setting up a commission to explore the  
'reform, replacement or repeal' of the legislation. The Conservative  
spokesperson, Shadow Home Secretary, David Davis, said that 'Once  
we had inherited English liberties; now we have incorporated European  
rights ... once, the law limited the state and enlarged the sphere in  
which the citizen could be free; now, it imposes obligations on the state  
and limits the freedom of the citizen' (quoted in Guardian 23 August  
2004).  
 
Security and protection: two competing ideas of democracy  
 
Different actors, then, have prioritised different principles and (as they  
see it) necessities in the post-9f11 political context. There is widespread  
agreement that contemporary democracies face huge challenges.  
Government and critics both would recognise that they seek a 'protective' 
democracy. But the focus and style of the protection concerned  
differs markedly. Drawing partly upon models of democracy outlined by  
authors such as Lijphart (1999) and Held (1996) the Government's position can 
be called a majoritarian protective model of democracy.  
 
This majoritarian protective model of democracy displays a number of  
key features, which will be familiar from the above account in varying  
degrees. Although proponents of this model would agree that certain  
civil rights and liberties are fundamental, there is a view that the ranking  
of such rights can shift and change according to political and other  
circumstances. So, for example, in the face of a new style of terrorist  
threat, the right to life or the right to basic security assumes a greater relative  
importance than the right to free speech, the right to free movement,  
or the right to legal due process. Implicit within this view is an idea that  
rights and liberties are, albeit to some limited degree that is difficult to  
specify, the gift of the state and not necessarily the inviolable prior  
possession of the free citizen. This model respects the constitutional role  
of the judiciary in democracies, but nonetheless reserves the right of the  
democratically accountable executive to respond to the perceived fears of  
citizens by encroaching on established judicial principles or routines, in  
extraordinary circumstances. The elected executive, in other words, is  
first among equals when it comes to fundamental issues of protection of  
(assumed) most fundamental citizen rights and liberties. Its proper  
concern lies with the shorter-term impact of protective measures on a  
minority who pose dangers.  
 
This model is unapologetically national, regarding the nation state as  
the primary location for the enunciation of political interest and the  
interpretation of the appropriate scope and application of rights and  
liberties. It assumes that 'protection' (and security) should be interpreted  
in terms of threats to citizens posed by individuals and groups who target  
the society -enemies, internal and external ones, are what we need  
protection against. It also recognises that 'balances' are important in  
questions about rights and liberties, and it interprets balance as being  
between liberty, on the one hand, and security or protection from  
enemies on the other. The majoritarian protective model sees within this  
need for 'balance' the possibility of limited but legitimate trade-offs of  
some measure of liberty in the name of security and protection. It sees the  
 
state as a set of institutions which must change and adapt, often in drastic  
ways, to new threats and circumstances; sometimes it is necessary to  
change the rules. Finally, these changes are carried through in the name  
of most people, or all citizens, or the 'vast majority'. It is a model of  
democracy with a populist, majoritarian character.  
 
In contrast, the model of the critics is best referred to as a constitutional  
protective model of democracy. According to this model fundamental  
rights and liberties are not the gift of the state but exist prior to the state  
and they are the inalienable possession of free citizens. It defends the strong  
judicial function of protecting those rights and liberties, and sees this function  
as fundamentally democratic even if judges are not themselves elected  
political actors (for theoretical accounts of the 'self-binding' character of  
democracy, see Elster and Slagstad 1988; Saward 1998). The primary  
concern of its advocates is the potential longer-term impact of measures on  
the rights and freedoms of all, not a minority. The constitutional protective  
model is more internationalist than the majoritarian protective model. It  
takes especially seriously international obligations and ED law, and denies  
that there can be a legitimate set of opt-outs from such obligations. The  
question of 'balance' is differently conceived; here, it is a question of 
constitutional balance between the executive and the judiciary. It is also highly  
sceptical that, in any fundamental way, the rules have changed.  
Constitutional protections in democracy are sacrosanct, they remain the  
bedrock of the rules of the system and even new and virulent threats are  
best combatted by deepening and defending those rules, rather than seeking  
to modify them. It is not the rules that change; the context changes, but  
the rules remain. Crucially, the constitutional protective approach highlights  
the need for the protection of citizens' rights and liberties against the  
state itself. Constitutionalists are wary of states grabbing powers, aware  
that powers adopted or created are rarely, if ever; given up. They are also  
suspicious that the targets of new, restrictive laws will not be the only  
targets in future -for example, restrictions on the freedom of speech and  
movement of a suspect minority today may in time become restrictions on  
a larger set of citizens, possibly even a majority, in the further future. One  
can see the suspicion of the over-mighty state in the efforts by some critics  
to promote time limits on the application of some new laws.  
 
Some prominent theorists of democracy, including MacPherson  
(1977), have embraced this 'protective model'. The most important classical  
theorist of this 'model' is arguably the great English utilitarian theorist  
Jeremy Bentham. In general terms, it is no doubt a core responsibility  
of a democratic government to protect its citizens' lives and freedoms  
from external threat. But the central thread of the so-called protective  
model has pointed in a quite different direction. Consider the words of  
Bentham:  
 
A democracy, then, has for its characteristic object and effect, the  
securing its members against oppression and depredation at the hands  
of those functionaries which it employs for its defence ... Every other  
species of government has necessarily, for its characteristic and  
primary object and effect, the keeping the people and non-functionaries  
in a perfectly defenceless state, against the functionaries their rulers  
... (quoted in MacPherson 1977, 36)  
 
Or, as the legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron has put it recently:  
 
True, the events of September 11 have heightened our fear of the worst  
that can be done to us by individuals and groups other than the state.  
And an increase in the power of the state may be necessary to prevent  
or diminish the prospect of that horror. But the existence ofa threat  
from terrorist attack does not diminish the threat that liberals have  
traditionally apprehended from the state. The former complements  
the latter; it doe not diminish it, and it may enhance it. (Waldron 2003,  
205, original emphasis)  
 
Conclusion  
 
Tony Blair has argued at different points in his premiership that his  
government is interested in what works, not in ideologically driven  
policy. But even if leaders and governments do not profess ideologies,  
invariably there are discernible threads in their thought and actions. One  
such thread in a series of policies and initiatives under Blair, especially in  
the broad area of criminal justice policy, has been to challenge an emphasis  
on individual rights and liberties and to seek a rebalancing in favour  
of community, obligation, and the rights of victims. At times this has  
become explicit, as for example in Blair's 'respect agenda', around which  
the government created a key position of 'coordinator for respect', sometimes  
called a 'czar', occupied by Louise Casey. After outlining a series of  
policy proposals designed to tackle 'anti-social behaviour' and putting  
victim rights and redress at the heart of criminal justice, the prime minister  
stressed the broader moral agenda:  
 
a modern civic society, underpinned by reformed public services and  
an active welfare state, won't emerge simply through better laws,  
tougher enforcement of obligations, sanctions and more police. As  
well ~s modernising the criminal justice system and tackling antisocial  
behaviour we also need to revive the spirit of community and  
social cohesion. As Martin Luther King argued in the 1960s' struggle  
 
 
 
 
for civil rights, laws 'restrain the heartless; they cannot change the  
heart' ... Only by rebuilding cohesive communities and reforming  
our criminal justice system can we achieve our vision of a strong and  
fair society. It means abandoning the rhetoric and false choices of the  
past. Since 1945 our politics has too often failed to articulate a coherent  
response to crime and anti-social behaviour. Restoring civic  
responsibility is not a betrayal of social justice, but essential for its  
realisation. (quoted in Observer 10 November 2002)  
 
Among the most prominent government policies within the broad  
range of this agenda are anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs) which  
were first introduced in 1999. ASBOs can apply to anyone found to  
harass or alarm neighbours or neighbourhoods. A series of related  
measures have been enacted by the government to address the rights of  
victims. Blair has long made plain his belief that Britain's criminal justice  
system is balanced far too much in favour of the rights of the criminal at  
the expense of the rights of the victim (Blair 2002). In 2005 he signalled  
his intention to intensify this programme, through tackling binge drinking  
and other low-level anti-social behaviour by on-the-spot fines, seizing  
the property of offending families, appointing local anti-social behaviour  
'sheriffs', introducing 'baby ASBOs' for under-lOs. This vision of  
community, respect, and obligation permeates these developments  
accompanied by criticisms from other parties, community workers and  
parts of Whitehall. The anti-social behaviour and respect programmes  
form part of a populist vision of instilling a sense of obligation and  
community into citizens, indeed to mould citizens in a particular way.  
Protecting victims and the vulnerable is a key part of the rhetoric at least.  
 
It is not stretching things too far to see close links between the government's  
anti-terrorism legislation and its broader agenda, as expressed  
through its respect and related programmes. Both display what I have  
called a majoritarian protective outlook on how democracy should be  
shaped and function. Likewise, critics of this agenda point to the dangers  
that civil rights and liberties are being placed under threat by the broader  
thrust of the government's criminal-justice reforms: the essence of the,  
position of the constitutional protective vision of democracy. The fascinating  
connection between these two visions, as played out in anti-terrorism  
debates and beyond, lies in the internal tensions in the idea of states  
'protecting' citizens. Amid the bluster and argument of day-to-day politics,  
basic conceptions of what democracy is, whom it protects from what  
and why, face off against each other. For some, the rules of the game have  
changed. For others, changed circumstances make the old rules more  
relevant than ever.  
 
